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1 MOTIVATION
The design of the Internet as a network of independent net-
works, or Autonomous Systems (ASes), allowed it to sponta-
neously evolve to the core communications technology for
contemporary society, but also resulted in the ossification of
its core protocols, and the opacity of its structure. The current
version of BGP [16], the de-facto inter-domain routing pro-
tocol, is over two decades old, and despite various revisions
since then, a number of serious problems have been build-
ing over time, including weak security, non-deterministic
behavior, and proneness to misconfiguration [10].
While the vulnerabilities inherent in the InternetâĂŹs ar-
chitecture have been known for decades, and there has been
a great extent of research to address them [14], the proposed
solutions have not been widely deployed due to the costs
and risks involved in replacing the existing network equip-
ment [12]. As a result, most networks rely on reactive defense
mechanisms [22]. Nonetheless, the highly distributed own-
ership of the Internet infrastructure and its highly dynamic
nature make the development of the appropriate anomaly
detection mechanisms far from trivial. Operators have full
control over their own infrastructure, but little knowledge of
what happens beyond their network perimeter. Third-party
services can extend the detection capabilities for some classes
of anomalies beyond an AS’s domain, but the costs involved
and concerns with data sharing make many operators reluc-
tant to outsource such functionalities [20]. Instad, operators
often resort in social media and mailing lists in an effort to
crowdsource the debugging of their routing issues [2], an
approach that can be error-prone and inefficient.
We take steps toward remedying this situation by develop-
ing CommunityWatch, an open-source system that enables
timely and accurate detection of BGP routing anomalies, by
leveraging meta-data encoded by AS operators directly on
their BGPmessages through the use of the BGP Communities
attribute.
2 HOW COMMUNITYWATCH WORKS
The key insight of our approach is that BGP is no longer
purely an âĂĲinformation hiding protocolâĂİ [18]. The flat-
tening of the Internet hierarchy [6], has led to very dynamic
and continuously growing peering clusters, and complex
Figure 1: Data collection methodology.
peering practices [9]. Consequently, operators require in-
creasing flexibility and expressiveness in defining their rout-
ing policies and communicating them to their neighbors. The
optional BGP Communities attribute [3] offers this flexibility
by allowing operators to encode arbitrary information on
their prefix announcements, including business relationship
types, route redistribution policies, location data, and traffic
blackholing requests to mitigate attacks [4]. Their use has
become increasingly popular, allowing us to use them as an
automated crowdsourcing mechanism for acquiring accurate
operator-provided information for about 50% of IPv4 and
30% of IPv6 updates. Between 2010 and 2016, the visible ASes
using BGP Communities more than doubled, and the number
of unique community values tripled to more than 50,000.
BGP Communities have the format X:Y, where X, Y are two
16-bit values (extended communities use four octets [19]). By
convention, the first two octets encode the ASN of the opera-
tor that sets the community, while the next two octets encode
denote the specific information carried by the Community,
as the ingress location of a route. Importantly, Communities
is a transitive attribute, which means that they can be prop-
agated through multiple AS hops, and we can mine their
values through publicly available BGP collectors.
Successful interpretation of the attached Communities val-
ues allowsmonitoring of BGP routes and gathering of routing
intelligence based on authoritative data instead of heuris-
tics. However, the Communities attribute lacks standardized
values and semantics. Many operators document their Com-
munities values in Internet Routing Registry (IRR) records, or
their webpages, but typically not in machine-parsable format.
To decipher the Communities values in an automated man-
ner, we combine a web-mining tool with Google’s Google
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(a) Aggregated routing activity. (b) Routing activity filtered based on BGP
Communities.
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Figure 2
Cloud Natural Language API [11] to achieve the automatic
compilation of a Communities dictionary, as explained in [7].
As of March 2018, the dictionary included 11,830 interpreted
Communities, 48% of which encode geolocation data, 21% en-
code relationship type, and the rest encode different types of
routing policies (selective advertisement, blackholing, local
preference tuning, path prepending).
Figure 1 illustrates the data extraction methodology. The
system combines the interpreted Communities with a live
stream of BGP data, obtained through through BGPStream [15],
to extract BGP updates annotated with the corresponding
Communities. During the initialization phase, we contin-
uously monitor the incoming BGP messages to establish a
baseline of paths that are consistently tagged with a stable set
of Communities. Then, CommunityWatch monitors the base-
line of annotated paths to capture changes through explicit
BGP withdrawals, or through changes in the attached Com-
munity values. Routing updates are binned in time intervals
to correlate path changes with routing incidents. The system
uses a binning interval of 60 seconds (twice the default MRAI
time [17]). Whenever we detect a binning interval for which
the paths deviating from the baseline exceed a minimum
threshold, we trigger a signal of potential routing anomaly.
Depending on the type of Communities, the corresponding
signal investigation module analyzes the affected paths to
determine the root cause of the observed change.
3 ANOMALY DETECTION USE CASES
The fact that BGP Communities encode different categories
of routing meta-data, means that CommunityWatch can de-
tect a wide range of routing anomalies. In this section we
illustrate three such cases.
Infrastructure Outages In the past, the AS-path data
have been used to study changes in prefix availability and
reachability, and reveal the occurrence of outages due to
country-level censorship, attacks, or natural disasters [1].
However, the coarse granularity of AS-paths has hindered
detailed analysis of infrastructure outages, since many fail-
ures may change the infrastructure-level path, e.g., switching
to another PoP, but the AS-path remains the same. Thus, an
AS-path level and prefix-level analysis cannot show such fail-
ures. Communities are often used to encode location informa-
tion at fine granularities, such as IXP-level, and facility-level
Points-of-Presence. Figure Figure 2b illustrates how using
BGP Communities to filter the routing activity can reveal an
outage at the France-IX IXP [5], by effectively de-noising the
aggregated routing activity 2a that obscures the impact of
localized events on the dynamics of BGP. We provide more
details on the detection of infrastructure-level outages in [7].
Detection of Blackholed Prefixes Blackholing is a pop-
ular DDoS mitigation strategy inside a single network or
among multiple networks. BGP enables blackholing by lever-
aging the BGP communities attribute. Networks trigger black-
holing requests by sending BGP announcements to their BGP
neighbors for specific destination prefixes with the appro-
priate blackhole community. Parsing of these values enable
CommunityWatch to differentiate blackholing requests from
normal BGP announcements, and characterize prefixes under
attack, as we explain in [8]. Figure 2c illustrates how Com-
munityWatch can be used to characterize the longitudinal
growth of blackholing usage.
Route leaks and policy violations Detection and anal-
ysis of export policy violations, such as violations of the
valley-free rule, is of particular importance for understudy-
ing BGP misconfiguration and characterizing misbehaving
networks [21]. Detection of such violations requires accurate
AS relationship data, but the universality of valley-free rule
is a fundamental assumption of relationship inference algo-
rithms. CommunityWatch detects such violations by parsing
relationship-tagging communities which are free from infer-
ence heuristics biases. We analyzed BGP data in March 2018
to find that over 3% of BGP paths violate the valley-free rule,
which cannot be captured by the AS-Rank algorithm [13].
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